Was the Saudi–Emirati clash sudden, or a long-delayed necessity? And in final analysis, are the positions of the two parties truly divergent, or are they governed by a stance that has guided their policies for decades? Can the Arab citizen—particularly one committed to Arab nationalism—trust Saudi Arabia when it was the principal partner in what was called the “Arab Coalition,” which targeted the unity of a central and historic Arab state, Yemen, through a war that lasted eight years? This is merely the latest episode in the Saudi role against Arab nationalism.
The role of the UAE was neither strange nor new. Rather, all Gulf entities were created in opposition to the Arab identity of the Peninsula and the Gulf, having been confined as statelets hostile to the project of Arab unity. Saudi Arabia, of course, preceded them all in this non-Arab objective.
All of this and more compels us to ask: where is Saudi Arabia heading in confronting the Zionist-American role of the UAE? Is its position anything more than competition between two regimes—even over closeness to the Zionist-American embrace? And is it possible to generate a stance or a climate for Arab action capable of confronting a project aimed at enslaving the nation—if not outright annihilating it?
The UAE intersects with the Zionist entity in many ways, beginning with their Western manufacture and extending to the dangerous nature of their roles—roles whose impact is constrained only by their demographic limitations.
In reading this clash, it is necessary to remind readers of the environment upon which the UAE built its anti-Arab, Zionist-American-serving policies: an environment of destroying republics, starting with the downgrading of Egypt, followed by the participation of several Arab states in the destruction of Iraq in 1991, leading to the occupation of Iraq and its transformation into a sectarian system led by the United States and whose conditions are largely shared with Iran.
Clearly, the participation of Arab regimes against Iraq—foremost among them Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria—at the tail end of Western armies was a deliberate hammering of a nail into the coffin of Arab nationalism, consciously and intentionally. This laid the groundwork for undermining Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and it has not stopped. This became evident in what was called the Arab Spring, leading today to the disarming of the resistance, and even stripping the entire Arab nation of any weapon—down to a kitchen knife.
It is perhaps laughable that Saudi Arabia, which led all this destruction in the Arab homeland, has only now—belatedly—realized that the fire has begun to burn the edges of its own cloak.
Accordingly, the question becomes: what is the nature of Saudi Arabia’s movement?
As for curbing the UAE, this is a positive step, but it falls within the continuation of Saudi Arabia’s non-Arab historical trajectory, or a conflict between one statelet and another—something that falls outside what is required from an Arab nationalist perspective. Read this way, it confirms that the United States engineered this conflict and set its boundaries. This raises the question: to what extent can Saudi Arabia deviate from the American vision governing its role, its oil, and even its internal security? If Arab republics weakened themselves through military coups, then kingdoms, protectorates, and sheikhdoms have suffered coups within ruling families—whether through assassination, as with King Faisal, or removal, as with Qaboos of Oman and Hamad of Qatar, or fratricide in the UAE, and so on. These, of course, are intra-family coups arranged by the United States.
Any analysis or project that does not begin from a rejection of fragmentation of Arab project is hostile to Arab nationalism.
Accordingly, forming an alliance or front—whatever its name—between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan to confront the dangerous role of the UAE is an alignment of contradictions. It amounts to rewarding Turkey, which occupies Syria and penetrates Libya and Somalia, has established full relations with the Zionist entity, and is a NATO member. In other words, Turkey is the most deeply rooted and aggressive force against the Arab nation, possessing a project that is clearly at the Arabs’ expense. This places it very close to imperialist strategy in the region, regardless of the fact that if Turkey, the Zionist-American forces, and the Zionists succeed in dismantling the Arab homeland into entities, the knife will eventually cut Turkey’s own limbs as well—killing the man once described as “the sick man.”
Arabs who promote a Turkish role are internalizers of defeat, despairing of any Arab renaissance. Ultimately, they are anti-Arab nationalist and thus seek rescue from nothing more than an enemy.
It is true that Pakistan does not have a project against the Arab homeland, despite its Islamic rhetoric. Its project is not at the Arabs’ expense, and its closeness or alliance with Saudi Arabia may simply be for financial benefit. If Saudi Arabia intends to rely on Pakistan for armament, it could simply go directly to Pakistan’s own arms suppliers.
From an Islamic perspective, neither Turkey nor Pakistan has fought the Zionist enemy in Palestine, and it seems that Pakistan’s nuclear bomb is not Muslim but atheist.
Regardless of the nature of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, any alliance between them is a positive beginning, even if it remains within the limits of their state-centric systems—less than an Arab nationalist dimension, fragmented, right-wing, reactionary, and even subordinate, but still better than nothing.
If there is a division of labor within a front composed of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, then Saudi Arabia and Egypt would, in effect, be selling Syria to Turkey, which would not hesitate to insist on its colonial presence in Libya and Somalia.
Yes, this is because Turkey has its own project, whose vital expansion comes at the expense of the Arabs—not in self-defense, at least for now.
The so-called Turkish–Zionist “dispute” is ambiguous, and there is nothing to confirm its authenticity. They are fighting over the division of Syria’s corpse, which is hostile and aggressive toward the Arab nationalist project—one of whose objectives was the overthrow of Syria, an objective that has indeed been achieved.
We conclude here by saying that an Egyptian–Saudi front, despite the dependency of both regimes, is a better beginning than nothing. However, it must be strengthened. Strengthening this alliance requires dispensing with bargaining with Turkey. While the moment may not yet call for confrontation with Turkey but rather for neutralizing it, what is required of Egypt and Saudi Arabia is the following:
First: Saudi Arabia must lift its destructive hand from Yemen and call for comprehensive Yemeni–Yemeni dialogue, especially since the Southern Transitional Council is an Emirati fabrication and primed for Zionization, as evidenced by Aidarous al-Zubaidi. A relationship of good neighborliness between Saudi Arabia and all of Yemen is the beginning of an Arab bloc that could expand geographically and nationally—even if under non-progressive regimes—because this is a world of large blocs, not fragments.
Second: Egypt must open up to Algeria so that an Arab alliance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria is formed, with calm relations with Yemen until it stabilizes.
In this context, better relations with Iran are the logical path instead of alliance with Turkey. True, Iran—like Turkey and the Zionist entity—has its own project, but this requires reading the nature of Arab relations with each of the three projects. In this regard, Iran is closer to the Arabs than Turkey, and disputes with it are more manageable compared to Turkey, which has geographical—not merely geopolitical—ambitions in the Arab homeland, is a NATO member, and has never presented proof of innocence from Zionism.
The Dangers of Sectarianism and Political Religion
Among the strangest and most dangerous phenomena filling satellite channels and newspapers are analyses by Arabs who speak of a Zionist project, a Turkish project, and an Iranian project, acknowledging that these projects fight or compete over the Arab homeland—not over the geography of any of the three powers (noting that the geography of the Zionist entity does not belong to it).
What is strange is that these defeated figures—or tools, hirelings, or the deranged—fail to mention the major problem: the absence of an Arab project. They proceed without any reference to it whatsoever.
They further undermine Arab collective consciousness when they speak of:
1. A Turkish – Arab project based on a Sunni sectarian alliance, claiming strong ties at this level—while “Muslim” Turkey is the very state that has occupied Syrian lands since 1923, 1939, and 2024, as well as Iraqi and Libyan lands. Turkey operates purely on the basis of its national interests, while these people chase after it, hoping to cloak it in a trivial and dangerous sectarian garb whose essence is subordination based on political religion—a nationalism in Turkey but not Arab nationalism.
2. An Iranian project based on a Shiite sectarian foundation between Iran and Arab Shiites who are not Arab nationalist.
These analyses come from intellectuals and politicians tied to the regimes of Turkey and Iran. Their motive is not Islamic faith but political religion. In the end, they serve those states and betray the Arab nation, working to inflict absolute death upon the Arab nationalist project—leaving the Arab nation a victim, torn apart by other nations.
While Saudi Arabia and Egypt search for allies, the UAE is doing the same, negotiating with India and the Zionist entity. India’s role is extremely dangerous to the Arab nation, especially in the Gulf.
It is well known that the fragile demographic structure of Gulf entities is a massive flaw that Arab nationalists have warned against for decades. Yet these oil protectorates persisted in their folly, intoxicated by oil wealth, until Arabs became a marginalized minority within them—because they preferred Indians and others over Arab labor. The Kurds could also be added to this alliance.
An alliance between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, even on its own, can play a role in braking two real dangers facing Arab nationalism:
Normalization,
and Abrahamism.
Weakening normalization undermines Netanyahu’s position, who sees normalization as his achievement—namely, the official Arab descent behind the nation’s lines, especially the lines of resistance. This contributes to diminishing the Zionist project or at least confronting it politically. Likewise, Abrahamism undermines claims of unifying the three religions into one faith, which is ultimately directed against Islam—and, of course, against the Arabs.
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The opinions and views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Kana’an’s Editorial Board.
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