I hope that the number of those convinced by the aggression against Iran—regardless of its outcomes—will increase, recognizing that the absence of a unified Arab state is a fundamental reason for the aggression against Iran. The existence of a unified state would uproot the existing Qutry “small fragment of the fragments Arab large Homeland” regimes, regardless of their characteristics, and would also remove what are called Western interests in the Arab homeland. These “interests” are in fact defects and disasters, as they represent economic, military, and cultural colonies manifested in psychological warfare, the recruitment of agents, and, of course, Western plunder and exploitation of the Arab world.
From here, it is necessary to elaborate. Plunder and exploitation differ from the scientific, class-based concept of extracting surplus value and the conceptual transformations that have occurred within it. The discovery of these transformations began with Anouar Abdel-Malek, who expanded Karl Marx’s concept from surplus value to historical surplus value. Unfortunately, Abdel-Malek has always been treated unjustly, especially by the followers of various thinkers. He was also the first to write a critique of Orientalism before Edward Said.
For my part, after reading what Stephen Hymer and others later wrote about large multinational corporations, I wrote a paper in 1986 under the supervision of my colleague Dr. Mike Quinn. In it, I argued that globalized surplus value—since exploitation and production themselves have become globalized—means that the extraction of surplus value can occur at a supra-national level. Of course, the working class itself has also become globalized. I later published this idea in my English book:
Epidemic of Globalization: Ventures in World Order, Arab Nation and Zionism (2001, Palestine Research and Publication Foundation, Glendale, CA, USA).
I discussed the matter further in my Arabic book Political Economy and Class (Dar Fadaat, Amman, 2016, pp. 146–150). Later, my colleague Samir Amin devoted an entire book to this issue titled The Law of Worldwide Value (translated into Arabic by Saad Al-Tawil, National Center for Translation, Cairo, 2012; see p. 15).
With such an achievement, the United States, the West, and the Zionist entity would not need to fight Iran—assuming the claim is correct that Iran challenges their control over the Arab homeland. At the same time, a unified Arab state would also be resistant to Iran’s ambitions, if the Iranian regime were indeed aggressive or expansionist.
Because the current Arab regimes do not control the maritime passages—namely Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, and Bab al-Mandeb—nor do they control land routes or Arab airspace. All of these should be under the authority of a unified and strong state. Thus, I repeat: in the case of unity, the West would no longer need aggression against Iran, as its exploitation of the Arab homeland would have been uprooted. Consequently, the West would not fear alleged Iranian dominance, because a strong Arab homeland would deter any such control.
Indeed, in such a situation the West might instead attempt to court Iran in order to share influence over the Arab homeland, as it currently does with Turkey. In that case it would be difficult for the West to recreate the Shah’s role in Iran. Rather, Iran might orient itself more toward the East.
The aggression against Iran aims to prevent it from becoming a strong state in the region and instead to fragment it into smaller Iranian entities. On the other hand, even if Iran had ambitions to dominate parts of the Arab homeland, the presence of a unified Arab state would impose a relationship of equal alliances rather than hostile rivalry.
The most dangerous factor, however, is the aggressive colonial role of Turkey, which makes Arab unity even more necessary. What is alarming today is the flirtation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Turkey, which occupies Syria or complains that the United States reduced its control in Syria in favor of the Zionist entity while allowing Turkey greater freedom in Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Qatar. All of this confirms the disgrace that has befallen the Arab nation, whose homeland is openly being divided among enemies.
This also confirms that anyone who is not in favor of unity is linked to those enemies and carries within them a level of humiliation and betrayal that cannot be remedied.
This Egyptian-Saudi rapprochement is a model example of how the nation-state system has shrunk into the household or palace of the ruler, completely separating personal security from Arab national security. Without equivocation, this is a choice of weakness and reliance on an enemy who merely tolerates them temporarily. It stems from a condition below even sovereign decision-making—a surrender to dependency so long as it ensures the regime’s survival and self-gratification.
This concerns the Arab East. As for the nation-state regimes in the Maghreb, they live in fear of the West on the one hand and in mutual suspicion—particularly between Morocco and Algeria—on the other, where an explosion remains possible. The Moroccan regime openly aligns itself with normalization and hostility toward the Arab nation and even toward the Moroccan people themselves. This would not have been possible under a unified Arab state.
For years, a contradiction has been developing between the Nile Valley and Ethiopia, which is waging a form of war—though not military—against Egypt and Sudan, distracting and weakening them. This serves Western and Zionist interests in the Arab East and prevents Egypt from returning to lead the Arab homeland, even if only as a dependent leader of other dependent regimes. This situation would not exist under a unified state. It also reminds us that Ethiopia was more compliant during the period when the Nasserist regime in Egypt represented the Arab homeland to a significant extent, even without formal unity.
The sectarian, reactionary, dependent, and normalization-oriented Arab regimes—especially those involved in the falsehood of the “Abrahamic religion,” promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump, who simultaneously opens expansionist wars across the globe while his connections to Epstein’s island—associated with prostitution and the abuse of minors—are exposed—raise the question: what does any of this have to do with religion? Any Arab citizen who trusts or supports the Abrahamic project or normalization is in a pathological condition.
These regimes resemble chickens seeking protection from the West against any hawk—whether Turkish, Zionist, or even Iranian. The real issue is not whether American or Western bases managed to protect the Gulf “chicks” from an Iranian response. Resorting to the enemy for protection is itself disgraceful. Why are you weak and dependent on historical enemies and rivalries? Why do you have no armies capable of protecting you—yet you fought Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Libya?
And if you are structurally incapable of reaching the level of states that can protect themselves, then why not turn to unity? Clinging to the Qutry regime is therefore a betrayal of the people and a service to rulers who are themselves effectively ruled.
A large state, regardless of its economic, political, military, or even ethnic challenges, is more capable than any individual Arab state—small or large. A larger country means a larger market, greater productive and consumptive capacity, broader relations, and better negotiating conditions. The weak and small have no place except as appendages without weight, easily traded in deals among larger powers. Even medium-sized regimes—such as Turkey—operate this way.
Here I repeat: the fall of Syria occurred because it stood alone as a Qutry state while most Arab regimes contributed to its collapse and transformation into a base against Iran, built on three maladies: Qutry regime, sectarianism, and politicized religion. One cannot help but compare opposites: Iran’s resilience versus Syria’s collapse and internal disintegration.
This also exposed the absurdity of Donald Trump’s rhetoric—his astonishment that Iran did not surrender within days, his surprise that Iranians did not flee, and his rejection of a new Supreme Leader. Such statements fall somewhere between buffoonery, Orientalist thinking, and psychological warfare through lies.
Regardless of how the aggressive war and the defense unfold, Trump’s arrogance—claiming he wants a say in the nature of Iran’s future political system and even in its Supreme Leader, as if he were a colonial High Commissioner—is merely an attempt to project strength abroad in order to conceal weakness at home.
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The opinions and views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Kana’an’s Editorial Board.