— and where the Arabs Stand, by Dr. Adel Samara
Occupied Palestine
During conflict—indeed, during open aggression—it is difficult to determine outcomes and consequences. There is global consensus that any party can ignite a war, but not necessarily control it or stop it, regardless of its original intentions. However, this does not mean we should not engage with events based on available information, intentions, and, of course, interests and ideological motives—especially since war is rarely a hobby; it is an event driven by purpose.
As for the aggression against Iran, this does not mean that we Arabs are free from its consequences. Rather, we are part of the war: through participation—such as the role of resistance on one hand—and, unfortunately, through some among us, namely Gulf regimes, as a negative component on the other. More than that, the Arab Homeland has become a stage upon which others act, rather than an actor itself.
This means our engagement with the event should not be limited to journalistic coverage—mere observation and recording—or even analysis. As an Arab people, the majority of us stand with Iran. However, this majority stance must be guided by two considerations:
- Iran’s right to self-defense and the necessity of supporting it. Beyond that, if this nation were united, its mere existence would deter aggression against Iran, or it would actively participate in its defense—because the ultimate target of aggression against Iran is also us. The existence of the Zionist entity and Western occupation of the oil-rich Gulf is sufficient proof.
- The need not to forget our own Arab project, so we do not become mere spectators. We must use the event to develop our Arab unity project, remembering that Iran, even as a friend, is not our project nor a substitute for it.
This requires confronting all Qutri/territorial regimes, whether those serving the aggression or merely standing aside. These regimes—like those in the Gulf—are so fragile and lacking sovereignty that they enter alliances as dependents, not only of imperialism but even of regional powers, allowing those they follow to exploit them according to their interests.
Still Confused Today?
A misguided and dangerous mindset—particularly ahistorical analysis—dominates many in the Arab world. Some forget that Palestine is occupied and therefore fail to see that most of the Arab Homeland is also occupied. Others ignore that aggression against any Arab little area, i.e. even in rural Morocco is aggression against all, and instead speak of “national security” with the resolve of a chicken, rambling about how Arab armies were defeated in days in order to flatter resistance. This is cheap subservience. What was defeated were generals, not armies—rulers who betrayed their armies—alongside Western aggression that has targeted the الأمة Nation for three centuries.
We never claimed that the republics that were destroyed were led by flawless leaderships. But they tried and fought in Palestine and their own countries, which is why their dismantling was insisted upon, as promoted by enemies and their class. Political and cultural collaborators.
Wasn’t the broke the Bar Lev Line in 1973 by Egyptian army and they breached of shores of Tiberias by Syrian army a real victory?
Wasn’t Iraq the first to strike occupied Palestine with missiles? Didn’t Iraq, followed by Libya, first stop selling oil in dollars?
Yet mistakes were made: Egypt erred in protecting Kuwait in 1961; Iraq erred in the timing of Kuwait’s liberation in 1990; Syria erred in not re-annexing Lebanon in 1976; Libya erred in surrendering its weapons. The point is that any analysis must present a historical summary reflecting both sides of any system—otherwise we produce new slaves.
Excessive praise and excessive belittlement have both led to exaggerating imperialism and Zionism as omnipotent forces, justifying submission and internalized defeat.
Thus, we see entire regimes, parties, and even classes lamenting that the Zionist Entity is absolutely powerful, and that the “rational” choice is surrender. Ironically, they fail to see that it is merely a protectorate—something Gaza has demonstrated despite its small size and limited resources but immense dignity in resistance. The Zionist Entity is not a power itself but a tool of Western power—which has often been defeated.
No one understands the limits of this Entity better than itself, yet those who internalize defeat grant it opportunities to boast.
Whose War?
Confusion continues, leading some to simplistic and incorrect conclusions. Some claim Netanyahu manipulated or threatened Trump or convinced him Iran is weak and awaiting regime collapse. Others claim the Zionist lobby controls America and the world.
While media manipulation can distort perception, it must not blind insight. Western capitalism—then colonialism, then imperialism—did not create the Zionist entity to become its servant. Rather, Western capital contains Zionist capital within it. Their interests intersect and often align.
Fear-driven Arab discourse has led many to interpret wars as steps toward Armageddon instead of understanding them in terms of capital. Was Vietnam about Armageddon?
Some Americans themselves believe their country is led by a small state, reflecting an isolationist current. But as Lenin noted, it is naïve to think capitalism does not evolve into imperialism.
Imperialism becomes more aggressive when supported by active agents like the Zionist Entity, or when driven by military arrogance, faulty intelligence, or ideological fanaticism.
The key point remains: American capital sees the Arab Homeland as its last open domain. Destroying Iran ensures continued Arab dependency. Thus, the interests of the United States and the Zionist Entity are deeply aligned.
In Practice
The real issue is not Iran’s nuclear or ballistic capabilities, nor Netanyahu’s ambitions, but the existence of a unified Iranian state. The aggression followed a sequence: weakening Hizbullah in Lebanon, occupying Syria (December 2024), testing attacks in 2025, and now the current escalation.
Course of the War
Initial assumptions by aggressors proved wrong. Iran demonstrated leadership cohesion, societal resilience, and effective missile capabilities despite airspace control by the enemy.
As regime change became unlikely, the strategy shifted toward large-scale destruction without ground invasion—similar to Vietnam.
The entire West participates politically, militarily, and through the media. Gulf states also participated, either by hosting bases or through lack of sovereignty.
Iran responded by leveraging control over the Strait of Hormuz, globalizing the conflict and demonstrating the interconnectedness of the world.
Global Economic Losses
The economic impact is ongoing and difficult to quantify, but a global crisis is evident. Energy is central, affecting all sectors, including agriculture through fertilizer production.
Oil disruptions, supply chain issues, and rising insurance costs are driving inflation, unemployment, and potential global recession.
The war has also triggered financial instability, with capital shifting toward gold and away from the dollar.
Meanwhile, the U.S. has profited from higher energy prices, though rising costs undermine sectors like AI.
Strategic Outcomes
If Iran is defeated: it will likely be fragmented into smaller dependent states, expanding Western and Zionist control across the region and beyond.
If Iran survives or wins: even survival is a partial victory, maintaining a strong regional state and forcing shifts in Gulf and global alignments.
Ultimately, the real challenge is for Arabs: to emerge with some level of political, military, and economic unity. Without unity, there is no dignified future.
Is this possible?
Yes, if lessons are learned. No, given the current nature of dependent regimes.
Note: We did not address the role of the Zionist Entity to emphasize that it is a tool of America, and not an actor in its own right as Netanyahu claims. On the one hand, and on the other hand, its role and fate are linked to the nature of the development of the Arab position.
March 23, 2026
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The opinions and views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Kana’an’s Editorial Board.