America is the world’s most powerful military state and its largest consumer. Its currency remains in higher demand than those of nations that produce goods with greater global appeal, and its Treasury bonds are purchased by many from central banks to private business people.
Yet, instead of preserving this hegemony—and the relative absence of a counter-force like the former Soviet Union—America acts aggressively. This behavior undoubtedly stokes fear, anxiety, and mistrust among allies, let alone adversaries, prompting the question: Why?
This raises two critical issues:
First: Is the world truly multipolar enough to rein in America?
I addressed this in my book: Beyond De-linking: Development by Popular Protection vs. Development by State (2005, p. 15).
The world is indeed moving toward multipolarity; however, this appears to be a complex process—encompassing economic, political, social, and military dimensions—that unfolds gradually, as imperialism undoubtedly resists. Consequently, while non-military competition and skirmishes occur, the new poles have not yet reached the stage of counter-hegemony.
A second point to consider is whether the United States has a coherent plan—particularly during the Donald Trump era—given that some perceive U.S. policy as erratic and unsystematic. I believe this view is exaggerated; even the policy of a superpower—regardless of its might or aggressiveness—does not necessarily proceed smoothly without encountering shocks and resistance. As we shall see below, the United States is engaged in conflict: in Ukraine via Europe; in Iran directly and in partnership with the Zionist Entity; in Cuba through blockade and strangulation; in Venezuela through abduction; and in Brazil, among other places such as the imposition of tariffs. When these elements are viewed together, they form a coherent matrix, even if their implementation is decentralized. This is not to say that the United States lacked a strategic plan for its acts of aggression prior to the Trump era.
This perspective sheds light on the coexistence of contradictions within America’s vast domestic landscape, thereby helping to answer the question posed earlier. Here, we must highlight one of two fundamental factors in this context: war.
Capital and the Business of War
The American economic system is one of monopoly-capitalist imperialism; it achieved its aforementioned hegemony through capitalism’s primary engine—war—whether by engaging in direct conflict, instigating and financing the wars of others, or occasionally funding opposing sides by supplying various nations.
While it is true that America is not fighting in Ukraine, it is leading the war there against Russia—regardless of Trump’s overtures to Putin. It supplies Europe with the weapons sent to Ukraine and imposes sanctions on Russia—particularly regarding energy—in order to sell its own energy
to Europe at prices higher than those of Russian energy—thereby reaping an additional windfall from the blockade imposed on Russia (let us call this the “blockade rent”—while simultaneously hindering the transport of Russian oil to China and pressuring Europe regarding NATO expenditures, particularly those related to European defense. Trump shifted away from the previous policy of relying on American military might to protect Europe, insisting instead that military spending rise to 2.5% of GDP by 2027—with an aim to reach 3% by 2030. This mandate constrains the scope for expanding public spending, given the backdrop of high public debt, persistent inflation, and anticipated interest rate hikes.
Ironically, Europe is unable to object due to the decline of its economies, which limits the liquidity needed to revitalize industrial production.
Regarding weaponry—an area where it relied on the United States, thereby remaining within the sphere of American containment.
Yet, this raises a question: Does Europe truly need a war with Russia?
This is a Europe that is struggling economically and lagging behind the United States and China technologically—to the point where many patents are shelved due to a lack of investment opportunities. It has failed to transform the European Union into a powerful bloc capable of competing with others; indeed, Britain—which has changed its political leadership seven times since 2016—has even withdrawn from the Union.
Despite its economic crisis, EU continues to claim it is defending Ukraine, relying on direct coordination with its allies. Furthermore, the Union’s most powerful state—Germany—mistreats other members, particularly Greece; the latter, despite its own economic crisis, has entangled itself in an alliance with the Zionist Entity, positioning itself against the Arabs.
Perhaps the question is more accurately phrased as follows:
Which Europe insists on fighting Russia despite its weakness?
Here, the class dimension imposes itself on the analysis, no matter how loud the chauvinistic nationalist voices become in concealing this class dimension, which is most evident in social crises.
Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of the era of globalization, which is currently experiencing a crisis, is the near-crystallization of a global capitalist class (the oligarchy) united by shared interests. The outlines of this class began to emerge in the 1970s with the rise of transnational corporations, about which Stephen Heimer was the first to write.
It is true that this stratum—if one may call it that—is not uniform in terms of resources, income, and consequently decision-making power; rather, it is characterized by a hierarchy—or a stratification of segments—that borders on a class-based hierarchy. Thus, to this day, decision-making regarding the management and financial flows of these corporations remains concentrated within their American wing—a wing that, incidentally, rarely reinvests this liquidity in the United States, preferring instead to hoard it in offshore tax havens. Consequently, these corporations fail to pay taxes commensurate with their massive revenues, all while the administration grants them tax exemptions or reductions, effectively shifting the tax burden onto the working classes. Indeed, polls indicate that the majority of the American public opposes a war of aggression against Iran; yet, the US administration persists in pursuing such a conflict—a situation reminiscent of the US-Western aggression.
Consider the Arab world’s stance against the wars on Iraq—whether in 1991 or 2003—when anti-war demonstrations drew millions, yet regimes (particularly those of the US and Britain) chose to launch the aggression. This confirms Lenin’s dictum that bourgeois power is the dictatorship of that class. While the popular classes did not rise to the level of tangible resistance, the underlying contradiction persists; hence, US power runs rampant globally, engaging in plunder to mitigate internal contradictions as much as possible—even though the popular classes receive only the crumbs.
Consequently, this class in the US is allied with, and mutually benefits from, the corporate-owning classes of Europe and Japan, while the third-tier allied stratum—or class—consists of the comprador bourgeoisie in the peripheral nations.
Therefore, I call this alliance of these class-based segments—if it can even be called a class in the conventional sense—an alliance of the world bourgeoisie, led by the productive Western bourgeoisie and followed by the peripheral comprador bourgeoisie.
Perhaps this explains why Europe insists on war against Russia and reveals another secret: Europe’s aggressive dream of defeating Russia, occupying it, and dividing it with America. This delusion has its roots in the worst global event: the triumph of capital over labor, which ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the People’s Republic of China from a socialist system to, at best, a more moderate one.
Here, it is necessary to recall what one of the predators of imperialism, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, said: “We had
“We signed a treaty with Russia to provide a smokescreen for our actions in arming Ukraine against Russia”—meaning they deceived Russia just as they had in 2011 during the NATO aggression against Libya.
In contrast to this allied “class”—globally cohesive through shared interests and the one that steers governments (rather than the other way around), with many of its members occupying the highest echelons of state decision-making—there are the popular classes. Whether termed the working and peasant classes or the global proletariat, these remain fragmented; each class within a specific country is bound by that country’s authority and lacks the unity of an organized international movement. It was for this reason that the late Samir Amin, shortly before his passing, called for the necessity of a new internationalism.
In other words, there is a global class—or leadership—that is bourgeois and predominantly Western (specifically American); it is this class that is fighting not only against Russia in Ukraine but also in numerous other locations worldwide. It engages in aggression driven by its own interests—motivated by neither religion nor race, nor even masculinity.
The aggression against Iran serves as a prime example of this globalized capitalist class alliance—a war alliance waged by the United States and the Zionist entity. It proceeds in stages with shifting objectives, ranging from a war of liquidation to a war of attrition. This alliance unites American capitalism and Zionism, with Western Europe playing a low-profile role, while Arab regimes in the Gulf participate by hosting American bases from which US warplanes launch their operations.
While the aggression against Iran exposed the failure of these bases to safeguard the interests of those regimes, Trump repeatedly declares that his true aim is for Arab OPEC members to shoulder the costs of the US military presence in the region. He proposes a new arrangement requiring these states to pay the US for military protection—not through transit fees, but via investment in the US economy—even though that protection failed to materialize. It is worth noting here that these bases effectively constitute US-occupied territory. Gulf regimes dare not expel them even if they wished to do so, and the bases serve as launchpads for aggression against Iran, underscoring the regimes’ lack of sovereignty over their own land.
Note: A single article cannot fully cover the role of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world, necessitating a series of articles. I also recommend consulting my book: The Political Economy of the Rise and Decay of Neoliberalism, The United States as a Case Study, available on the Lulu website. Link to Adel Samara’s books on Lulu: